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Friday, October 10, 2008

Bye-Bye Pave Low, Hello Osprey


The deployment of the CV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft to North Africa this month for Operation Flintlock 09 overshadows the retirement of the long-serving MH-53 Pave Low helicopter. The final Pave Low mission was flow in Iraq in September by the Air Force’s 20th Expeditionary Special Operations Squadron.

Once numbering 39 helicopters, the Pave Low fleet was employed around the world for low-level missions to insert and take out special forces as well as for Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR) operations. The Sikorsky H-53 series is the largest helicopter flown in the West, with the largest (three-turboshaft) H-53E variants also flown by the U.S. Navy (MH-53E) and Marine Corps (CH-53E).

The Air Force retired the last MH-53M Pave Low IV variants -- all upgraded from earlier models -- in September. The Air Force is acquiring 50 Bell-Boeing CV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft for the special operations role. The CV-22 and MH-53 are roughly the same size (but with very different configurations); however, the Osprey is much faster and has a greater range, and is provided with an in-flight refueling capability. (In July 2006 two MV-22s flew across the Atlantic in the first trans-ocean flight of the aircraft.)

The Marine Corps has already forward deployed its Osprey variant, the MV-22. In October 2007 the Marines sent ten MV-22s to Iraq, where they continue to operate. The Marines have a requirement for 360 MV-22s for the assault and combat support missions, replacing the long-serving CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter. (The original Marine requirement -- developed during the Cold War era -- was for 552 MV-22 aircraft.) The Marines currently have four MV-22 deployable squadrons plus a transition squadron, with a schedule to activate two additional squadrons per year.

http://www.defensetech.org/

War Spurs Change in Sniper Gear, Tactics


October 08, 2008

The conflicts stemming from the attacks on 9/11 showed America's military snipers were badly in need of modernization. Their gear, operational doctrine and training needed an update -- and fast. As the war evolved, units with combat experience shared lessons learned, identifying new requirements for a unique conflict. Fortunately the services took notice and began to revamp the sniper community in numerous ways.

Problem: Inadequate/outdated doctrine.

Solution: Small-unit leaders began to develop employment strategies that earlier training never covered, based on the current situation and environment. This, coupled with after-action reports, lessons learned and the general sharing of information, led to comprehensive sniper planning, support and employment-things like providing security for the sniper team during movement and relying on the sniper to provide the real-time intelligence for on-the-spot combat decisions.

Probably the biggest change was when-and-how to bring the snipers to bear for the desired result. Unit leaders learned that snipers could control large areas, create enemy reluctance and force enemy movement in a desired direction. There was a gradual recognition of how valuable assets like snipers and designated marksmen could be when properly utilized.

Problem: Inadequate equipment.

Solution: A number of commercially procured items became popular, including the Eberlestock pack, which allows the sniper to carry his rifle on his back protected and concealed while he carries a battle rifle for his own protection during movement. Other items such as rests, tripods and various bipods were procured to meet the varied terrain and conditions.

The issued spotting scope and tripod did not perform as needed in environments where ranges were either very long or very short, and precise optical definition was an absolute requirement for friend-or-foe identification. High-end spotting scopes such as the Leupold 12-40x60mm Mark 4, Zeiss 85mm, and Swarovski ATS 80's were quickly procured along with better quality tripods/mounts. Hydration systems, too, became a crucial ingredient in the sniper's pack.

The sniper of today is vastly better outfitted than he was six years ago. Individual and organizational efforts outside of official channels to provide free equipment/gear to snipers played a huge role in sniper evolution as well. Groups such as "Adopt a Sniper" (www.AmericanSnipers.org) collected and pushed large quantities of equipment to operators in the war zone and provided a conduit for specific requests from the field. In most cases the equipment was donated by industry or provided at a huge discount.

Problem: Inadequate optical sights.

Solution: Early on the word went out to procure optics for a variety of uses from crew-served weapons to M4 carbines. Many snipers purchased or procured variable-power optics for use on their sniper systems to allow them to open up their field of view while retaining the zoom capabilities.

In other cases higher-power optics were procured to allow the snipers to engage at extended ranges. The Marine Corps was in the process of selecting the Schmidt & Bender PMII (a.k.a. M8541), which has proved to be an outstanding product. Many Army units procured the Leupold Mark 4 M3 LR/T 3.5-10X as a replacement for the fixed 10X Leupold M3 "Ultra." Many other optics companies such as U.S. Optics and Nightforce saw increased sales of their products in an effort by the military to meet field requirements.

The acquisition of new optics also opened up the need or desire for mission-enhancing accessories. Devices such as the "angle cosine indicator" from Sniper Tools and a variety of mounting solutions like the Modular Accessory Rail System from Remington became popular and are now in widespread use.

In addition to the new optics, mounts and accessories, this new war brought interest in new reticule systems such as those offered by Horus Vision, Leupold, Nightforce and U.S. Optics, which provide different or enhanced approaches to range estimation, hold offs, elevation/windage changes and firing solutions.

Problem: A shortage of snipers and precision weapons.

Solution: Simple things such as adding an optic to an M4/M16, which previously had been considered "Hollywood," became the norm with the widespread purchase of the Trjicon ACOG. While not by itself a "sniper" system, units quickly discovered that troops with above-average shooting ability and snipers could extract a heavy toll on the enemy with such a system. It was this revelation that helped define the concept of the designated marksman - basically a soldier with slightly more training than the average grunt, equipped with an optically sighted rifle to engage targets at ranges the "typical" shooter could not.

Problem: Modernization of existing SWS (Sniper Weapons Systems.)

Solution: Around 2004, Remington introduced its M24A2 as an upgrade to the M24. This included a new stock, variable power optics, an optics rail that allows the use of in-line night vision IR lasers and a sound suppressor. While being very popular with the snipers, funding and authorization have never materialized. The U.S. Navy worked with Sage International to procure the Enhanced Battle Rifle, which is a modified M14 placed in an aluminum chassis that features multiple rails and a collapsible stock. They found this combination, although somewhat heavy, to be very effective. The Corps has conducted a variety of experiments with adding suppressors to their M40A3's but to date these suppressors are not in widespread use.

Problem: Rate of fire.

Solution: This problem gave rise to the development by the Army of the Semi-Automatic Sniper System solicitation. This effort was intended to procure a 7.62 semi-auto system that provided the accuracy of a bolt system in addition to the rapid firing capability of a semi. The Army eventually selected a system which they are now beginning to field in small quantities. The original concept was to replace all of the bolt-action systems with the new autoloading system. But it now appears that snipers need both capabilities. The USMC and USAF are currently reviewing the concept to determine which direction they will go.

Problem: Weight and the inability to engage targets at ranges beyond 1,000 meters.

Solution: Early solutions included the application of the .300 WinMag, but the availability of ammo was an issue. Many U.S. allies fielded systems chambered in .338 Lapua Magnum, which has gained considerable popularity among U.S. snipers. It remains unclear as to what direction this will take, as both industry and the services themselves are exploring alternatives.

The benefit of the current conflict in terms of equipment and technology development has been vast and modernization efforts in this area will likely continue. As in any war, necessity has been the mother of invention and snipers have never been as educated and well equipped as they are today.

http://www.military.com/news/article/war-spurs-change-in-sniper-gear-tactics.html?col=1186032369115

M4 Round Has Strong Competitors


October 10, 2008

Eugene Stoner and ArmaLite designed and built a lightweight, powerful, small-caliber shoulder weapon after the Army asked for help to develop a 5.56x45mm chambered military rifle in 1957.

The Army, looking ahead to a jungle war in Southeast Asia, picked the lightweight design to equip its new, highly-mobile soldier. But the Army did not fully adopt the specific design requirements that made the original AR-15 operate effectively.

No one recognized that the ball powder substituted by the Pentagon had a greater fouling effect on the AR bolt assembly and chamber area. In addition, troops were not properly trained on how to clean their new rifles. The result was a weapon that was susceptible to jamming in the field, giving the new rifle a bad reputation right off the bat.

The poor initial performance, together with the marginal incapacitating ability of the 5.56 round, led to doubts about the Stoner design that linger today. But the mobile warriors of today are frequently getting in and out of vehicles and need a shorter weapon. The loss of active barrel length in the M4 further cuts the overall effectiveness of particular loads of the 5.56 round that many already considered to be too small and weak.

Recognizing the dilemma, military and civilian manufacturers are developing rounds for the AR platform that could bridge accurate lethality and shorter barrels. Two different approaches are strong contenders: the 6.8 SPC (Special Purpose Cartridge) and the 6.5 Grendel.

Both the 6.8 SPC and 6.5 Grendel have a greater potential for immediate lethality than the 5.56, based on a heavier bullet traveling at a comparable speed. During tests, shots taken at distances ranging from 50 to 75 yards with the 6.5 Grendel at medium-sized wild hogs produced many first-round lethal hits, as well as immediate incapacitation. The bullets did not exit but fragmented during passage through the tissue.

The accuracy of 6.5 Grendel and 6.8 SPC was excellent. The groups for each caliber met or exceeded previously published data. The ability to stay on target during full-auto fire was achievable and far exceeded any similar .308-caliber weapon on hand for controllability. Our overall conclusion is that both the 6.5 Grendel and 6.8 SPC demonstrate superior effectiveness when compared to the 5.56 -- transferring more energy using a larger, purpose-formed bullet.

The 6.8 SPC is a well-engineered combination of velocity, accuracy and reliability for combat engagements up to 500 meters. With a trajectory very similar to the .308 WIN, the 6.8 SPC provides almost 50 percent more downrange, terminal-energy than the 5.56 NATO at 100-200 meters. However, at distances greater than 400 yards, performance of the 6.8 SPC is inferior when put up against the .308 Win or the 6.5 Grendel.

The 6.5 Grendel bullet is designed for energy retention during flight and has about twice the mass of the 5.56 NATO, with ballistics superior to the soviet-era 7.62x39 mm round. It maintains a devastating impact on tissue at longer ranges. The flat-shooting round has demonstrated one minute-of-angle accuracy beyond 600 meters, where the performance of the 6.8 SPC falls off.

Overall, both the 6.5 Grendel and 6.8 SPC offer similar hard-hitting short-and-intermediate range performance with .308 accuracy out to intermediate ranges. The 6.5 Grendel has the edge past 600 meters. Given a choice, I would take the better ballistic bullet of the 6.5 Grendel, which has incapacitating lethality for most tactical situations from CQB to out beyond 600 meters. However, the logistical support for the 6.5 Grendel and 6.8 SPC has been inconsistent. In addition, the demonstrated ability of the 5.56 green-tip to penetrate light armor and steel plate better than the 6.5 Grendel or 6.8 SPC will be of interest to operators who might have to take on technicals when under fire.

Although no single caliber will provide the operator with a solution to every tactical problem, many warriors interviewed would still take the M855 5.56 due to overall satisfactory performance and ammo availability. One of the important aspects of the "is the M4 good enough" argument is to ensure that the "real" trigger-pullers have the loudest voice and overriding opinion about what works in the field.

http://www.military.com/news/article/m4-round-has-strong-competitors.html?col=1186032310810

The Kommando Spezialkräfte (Special Forces Command, KSK)











The Kommando Spezialkräfte (Special Forces Command, KSK) is part of Germany's Special Forces. Organized under the Special Operations Division (Div. Spezielle Operationen, DSO), it is closely modeled on the British Special Air Service (SAS).History

Prior to KSK’s formation in 1996, Germany, and before it West Germany, placed little emphasis on special operations beyond the counter-terrorist police unit GSG 9. At the time, the airborne brigade commandos and Fernspäher companies were the only army units comparable to Special Forces (the navy already had its Kampfschwimmer company for years). All the early specialised army units except for one Fernspähkompanie have been disbanded or merged into the KSK since its activation on April 1, 1997.

Like all German military units, KSK deployment requires parliamentary authorization, providing evidence of operations in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan. Specific operational details, such as success or casualty rates, are top secret and withheld even from members of parliament. This practice drew heavy criticism, resulting in plans to increase transparency and accountability by relaying mission details to selected members of the Bundestag.

Structure

The fighting units are divided into four commando companies of about 100 men each and the special commando company with veteran members, taking supporting tasks. Each of the four commando companies has five specialized platoons:

* 1st platoon: land insertions
* 2nd platoon: airborne operations
* 3rd platoon: amphibious operations
* 4th platoon: operations in special geographic or meteorological surroundings (e.g. mountains or polar regions)
* 5th platoon: reconnaissance, sniper and counter-sniper operations
* Command Platoon

There are four commando squads in every platoon. Each of these groups consists of about four equally skilled soldiers. One of each group is specially trained as weapons expert, medic, combat engineer or communications expert respectively. Additionally a group can contain other specialists, e.g. heavy weapons or language experts.

Selection and training

Initially, only officers and non-commissioned officers of the Bundeswehr could apply to the KSK. The basic Bundeswehr Commando course ("Einzelkämpferlehrgang") was a prerequisite for application. Since 2005, application is also open for civilians and enlisted personnel, who have to complete an 18-month Long Range Surveillance training before the KSK selection phases.

The selection is divided into two phases, a three-week-long first phase with a fitness and psychological test (about 50% pass rate) and a three-month-long second phase testing physical endurance (8 - 10% pass rate). The KSK use the Black Forest as a testing area for this phase. In this time the candidates must undergo a 90-hour long distance cross-country run. Then they have to go through a three week international survival, escape and evasion course called Combat Survival Course at the German Special Operations Training Centre (formerly the International Long Range Reconnaissance School) in Pfullendorf.

If candidates have passed these tests, they can begin their 2 to 3 year training in the KSK. This training includes about 20 Jungle, Desert, Urban and Counter-terrorism specialist courses at over 17 schools worldwide, e.g. in Norway (Arctic), Austria (Mountains), El Paso/Texas or Israel (Desert), San Diego (Water) or Belize (Jungle).

According to press releases from May 2008, the Bundeswehr aims to advance the attractivity of service in the KSK to women[1]. This is in part due to the fact that the KSK could never reach its targeted number of troops in the past[2]. Although the KSK wasn't explicitly restricted to male troops since the Bundeswehr opened all units to women in 2001, so far no woman has been able to pass the physical requirements of the KSK.

Equipment:

* H&K P8 semi-automatic pistol
* H&K USP Tactical
* H&K Mark 23
* H&K 416 assault rifles
* H&K G36 assault rifle with AG36 grenade launcher, in different versions including the G36C
* H&K G3
* H&K MP5 submachine gun in various versions including the H&K MP5K
* H&K MP7 submachine gun
* H&K UMP submachine gun
* G22 sniper rifle
* G24 sniper rifle
* H&K PSG-1 sniper rifle[citation needed]
* Panzerfaust 3 rocket propelled grenade
* H&K MG4 squad automatic weapon
* H&K 21 general purpose machine gun
* Rheinmetall MG3 general purpose machine gun
* H&K GMG automatic grenade launcher
* Mercedes-Benz G-Class utility vehicles
* AGF (Light infantry vehicle)
* Snowmobiles
* Klepper canoes
* Round parachute and HALO/HAHO equipment.

German Commandos Withdrawn From Afghanistan



October 9, 2008: Germany is pulling its commandos out of Afghanistan. The KSK commandos have been there for most of the last seven years. Many Germans, especially leftist politicians and journalists, have not been happy with that. This has resulted in several unflattering, and largely inaccurate, articles about the KSK in the German media. There was also an investigation of several KSK men, accused of kicking an Afghan prisoner. While the KSK were allowed to fight, they also operated under some restrictions. They generally could not fire at the enemy unless first fired upon. This led to at least one senior Taliban leader getting away from the KSK. The fleeing Taliban honcho was not firing at the pursuing KSK, so the commandos could not take him down.

Germany sent 120 KSK commandos to Afghanistan in late 2001. They were not given their own area of operation, but worked with American special forces and commandos as needed. The KSK commandos are the first German troops to engage in combat since 1945 (not counting some communist East German military advisers who may have had to defend themselves in places like Africa. German peacekeepers in the 1990s Balkans have not had to fight.) KSK's achievement was celebrated in late 2001, when a supply of quality German beer was flown in for the troops.

The KSK were respected by their fellow special operations soldiers, and particularly liked because the Germans were sent beer rations (two cans a day per man). The KSK troops would often share the brew with their fellow commandos, which sometimes resulted in favors in the form of special equipment or intel data. Even with the restrictions, the KSK saw lots of action, but little of it was publicized, lest it generate more criticism back home.

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsf/articles/20081009.aspx